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In this paper we study the problem of exact recovery of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria (PSNE) set of a graphical game from noisy observations of joint actions of
the players alone. We consider sparse linear influence games — a parametric class of
graphical games with linear payoffs, and represented by directed graphs of n nodes
(players) and in-degree of at most k. We present an `1-regularized logistic regression
based algorithm for recovering the PSNE set exactly, that is both computationally
efficient — i.e. runs in polynomial time — and statistically efficient — i.e. has
logarithmic sample complexity. Specifically, we show that the sufficient number
of samples required for exact PSNE recovery scales as O (poly(k) log n). We also
validate our theoretical results using synthetic experiments.
1 Introduction and Related Work
Non-cooperative game theory is widely regarded as an appropriate mathematical framework
for studying strategic behavior in multi-agent scenarios. The core solution concept of Nash
equilibrium describes the stable outcome of the overall behavior of self-interested agents —
for instance people, companies, governments, groups or autonomous systems — interacting
strategically with each other and in distributed settings.
Over the past few years, considerable progress has been made in analyzing behavioral data
using game-theoretic tools, e.g. computing Nash equilibria [1, 2, 3], most influential agents
[4], price of anarchy [5] and related concepts in the context of graphical games. In political
science for instance, Irfan and Ortiz [4] identified, from congressional voting records, the most
influential senators in the U.S. congress — a small set of senators whose collective behavior
forces every other senator to a unique choice of vote. Irfan and Ortiz [4] also observed that the
most influential senators were strikingly similar to the gang-of-six senators, formed during the
national debt ceiling negotiations of 2011. Further, using graphical games, Honorio and Ortiz [6]
showed that Obama’s influence on Republicans increased in the last sessions before candidacy,
while McCain’s influence on Republicans decreased.
The problems in algorithmic game theory described above, i.e. computing the Nash equilibria,
computing the price of anarchy or finding the most influential agents, require a known graphical
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game which is not available apriori in real-world settings. Therefore, Honorio and Ortiz [6]
proposed learning graphical games from behavioral data, using maximum likelihood estimation
(MLE) and sparsity-promoting methods. Honorio and Ortiz [6] and Irfan and Ortiz [4] have
also demonstrated the usefulness of learning sparse graphical games from behavioral data in
real-world settings, through their analysis of the voting records of the U.S. congress as well as
the U.S. supreme court.
In this paper, we analyze a particular method proposed by Honorio and Ortiz [6] for learning
sparse linear influence games, namely, using logistic regression for learning the neighborhood
of each player in the graphical game, independently. Honorio and Ortiz [6] showed that the
method of independent logistic regression is likelihood consistent; i.e. in the infinite sample
limit, the likelihood estimate converges to the true achievable likelihood. In this paper we
obtain the stronger guarantee of recovering the true PSNE set exactly. Needless to say, our
stronger guarantee comes with additional conditions that the true game must satisfy in order
to allow for exact PSNE recovery. The most crucial among our conditions is the assumption
that the minimum payoff across all players and all joint actions in the true PSNE set is strictly
positive. We show, through simulation experiments, that our assumptions indeed bears out for
large classes of graphical games, where we are able to exactly recover the PSNE set.
Finally, we would like to draw the attention of the reader to the fact that `1-regularized logistic
regression has been analyzed by Ravikumar et. al. [7] in the context of learning sparse Ising
models. Apart from technical differences and differences in proof techniques, our analysis of
`1-penalized logistic regression for learning sparse graphical games differs from Ravikumar et.
al. [7] conceptually — in the sense that we are not interested in recovering the edges of the
true game graph, but only the PSNE set. Therefore, we are able to avoid some stronger and
non-intuitive conditions required by Ravikumar et. al. [7], such as mutual incoherence.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2 we provide a brief overview of
graphical games and, specifically, linear influence games. We then formalize the problem of
learning linear influence games in section 3. In section 4, we present our main method and
associated theoretical results. Then, in section 5 we provide experimental validation of our
theoretical guarantees. Finally, in section 6 we conclude by discussing avenues for future work.
2 Preliminaries
In this section we review key concepts behind graphical games introduced by Kearns et. al. [8]
and linear influence games (LIGs) introduced by Irfan and Ortiz [4] and Honorio and Ortiz [6].
2.1 Graphical Games
A normal-form game G in classical game theory is defined by the triple G = (V,A,U) of players,
actions and payoffs. V is the set of players, and is given by the set V = {1, . . . , n}, if there
are n players. A is the set of actions or pure-strategies and is given by the Cartesian product
A .= ×i∈VAi, where Ai is the set of pure-strategies of the i-th player. Finally, U .= {ui}ni=1, is
the set of payoffs, where ui : Ai ×j∈V \i Aj → R specifies the payoff for the i-th player given its
action and the joint actions of the all the remaining players.
A key solution concept in non-cooperative game theory is the Nash equilibrium. For a non-
cooperative game, a joint action x∗ ∈ A is a pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) if, for each
player i, x∗i ∈ argmaxxi∈Ai ui(xi,x∗−i), where x∗−i = {x∗j |j 6= i}. In other words, x∗ constitutes
the mutual best-response for all players and no player has any incentive to unilaterally deviate
from their optimal action x∗i given the joint actions of the remaining players x
∗
−i. The set of all
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pure-strategy Nash equilibrium (PSNE) for a game G is defined as follows:
NE(G) =
{
x∗
∣∣(∀i ∈ V ) x∗i ∈ argmax
xi∈Ai
ui(xi,x
∗
−i)
}
. (1)
Graphical games, introduced by Kearns et. al. [8], extend the formalism of Graphical models to
games. That is, a graphical game G is defined by the directed graph, G = (V,E), of vertices and
directed edges (arcs), where vertices correspond to players and arcs encode “influence” among
players i.e. the payoff of the i-th player only depends on the actions of its (incoming) neighbors.
2.2 Linear Influence Games
Linear influence games (LIGs), introduced by Irfan and Ortiz [4] and Honorio and Ortiz [6], are
graphical games with binary actions, or pure strategies, and parametric (linear) payoff functions.
We assume, without loss of generality, that the joint action space A = {−1,+1}n. A linear
influence game between n players, G(n) = (W,b), is characterized by (i) a matrix of weights
W ∈ Rn×n, where the entry Wij indicates the amount of influence (signed) that the j-th player
has on the i-th player and (ii) a bias vector b ∈ Rn, where bi captures the prior preference of
the i-th player for a particular action xi ∈ {−1,+1}. The payoff of the i-th player given the
actions of the remaining players is then given as ui(xi,x−i) = xi(wT−ix−i − bi), and the PSNE
set is defined as follows:
NE(G(n)) = {x|(∀i) xi(wT−ix−i − bi) ≥ 0} , (2)
wherew−i denotes the i-th row ofW without the i-th entry, i.e. w−i = {wij |j 6= i}. Note that we
have diag(W) = 0. For linear influence games G(n), we can define the neighborhood and signed
neighborhood of the i-th vertex as N (i) = {j| |wi,j | > 0} and N±(i) = {sign(wij)|j ∈ N (i)}
respectively. It is important to note that we don’t include the outgoing arcs in our definition of
the neighborhood of a vertex. Thus, for linear influence games, the weight matrix W and the
bias vector b, completely specify the game and the PSNE set induced by the game. Finally, let
G(n, k) denote sparse games over n players where the in-degree of any vertex is at most k, i.e.
for all i, |Ni| ≤ k.
3 Problem Formulation
Having introduced the necessary definitions, we now introduce the problem of learning sparse
linear influence games from observations of joint actions only. We assume that there exists
a game G∗(n, k) = (W∗,b∗) from which a “noisy” data set D = {x(l)}ml=1 of m observations
is generated, where each observation x(l) is sampled independently and identically from the
following distribution:
p(x) =
q1 [x ∈ NE∗]
|NE∗| +
(1− q)1 [x /∈ NE∗]
2n − |NE∗| . (3)
In the above distribution, q is the probability of observing a data point from the set of Nash
equilibria and can be thought of as the “signal” level in the data set, while 1−q can be thought of
as the “noise” level in the data set. We useNE∗ instead ofNE(G∗(n, k)) to simplify notation. We
further assume that the game is non-trivial1 i.e. |NE∗| ∈ {1, . . . 2n−1} and that q ∈ (|NE∗|/2n, 1).
1This comes from Definition 4 in [6].
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The latter assumption ensures that the signal level in the data set is more than the noise level
2. We define the equality of two games G∗(n, k) = (W∗,b∗) and Ĝ(n, k) = (Ŵ, b̂) as follows:
G∗(n, k) = Ĝ(n, k) iff (∀i) N ∗±(i) = N̂±(i) ∧ sign(b∗i ) = sign(̂bi) ∧ NE∗ = N̂ E .
A natural question to ask then is that, given only the data set D and no other information, is
it possible to recover the weight matrix Ŵ and the bias vector b̂ such that Ĝ(n, k) = G∗(n, k)?
Honorio and Ortiz [6] showed that it is in general impossible to learn the true game G∗(n, k) from
observations of joint actions only because multiple weight matrices W and bias vectors b can
induce the same PSNE set and therefore have the same likelihood under the observation model
(3) — an issue known as non-identifiablity in the statistics literature. It is, however, possible to
learn the equivalence class of games that induce the same PSNE set. We define the equivalence
of two games G∗(n, k) and Ĝ(n, k) simply as :
G∗(n, k) ≡ Ĝ(n, k) iff NE∗ = N̂ E .
Therefore, our goal in this paper is efficient and consistent recovery of the pure-strategy Nash
equilibria set (PSNE) from observations of joint actions only; i.e. given a data set D, drawn
from some game G∗(n, k) according to (3), we infer a game Ĝ(n, k) from D such that Ĝ(n, k) ≡
G∗(n, k).
4 Method and Results
Our main method for learning the structure of a sparse LIG, G∗(n, k), is based on using `1-
regularized logistic regression, to learn the parameters (w−i, bi) for each player i independently.
We denote by vi(W,b) = (w−i,−bi) the parameter vector for the i-th player, which character-
izes its payoff; and by zi(x) = (xix−i, xi) the “feature” vector. In the rest of the paper we use
vi and zi instead of vi(W,b) and zi(x) respectively, to simplify notation. Then, we learn the
parameters for the i-th player as follows:
v̂i = argmin
vi
`(vi,D) + λ ‖vi‖1 (4)
`(vi,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
log(1 + exp(−vTi z(l)i )). (5)
We then set ŵ−i = [v̂i]1:(n−1) and b̂i = −[v̂i]n, where the notation [.]i:j denotes indices i to j of
the vector. We show that, under suitable assumptions on the true game G∗(n, k) = (W∗,b∗),
the parameters Ŵ and b̂ obtained using (5) induce the same PSNE set as the true game, i.e.
NE(W∗,b∗) = NE(Ŵ, b̂). Before presenting our main results, however, we state and discuss
the assumptions on the true game under which it is possible to recover the true PSNE set of the
game using our proposed method.
4.1 Assumptions
The success of our method hinges on certain assumptions on the structure of the underlying
game. These assumptions are in addition to the assumptions imposed on the parameter q and
the number of Nash equilibria of the game |NE∗|, as required by definition of a LIG. Since the
2See Proposition 5 and Definition 7 in [6] for a justification of this.
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assumptions are related to the Hessian of the loss function (5), we take a moment to introduce
the expressions of the gradient and the Hessian here. The gradient and Hessian of the loss
function for any vector v and the data set D is given as follows:
∇`(v,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
{
−z(l)
1 + exp(vT z(l))
}
(6)
∇2`(v,D) = 1
m
m∑
l=1
η(vT z(l))z(l)z(l)
T
, (7)
where η(x) = 1/(ex/2+e−x/2)2. Finally, Hmi denotes the sample Hessian matrix with respect to the
i-th player and the true parameter v∗i , and H
∗
i denotes it’s expected value, i.e. H
∗
i
.
= ED [Hmi ] =
ED
[∇2`(v∗i ,D)]. In subsequent sections we drop the notational dependence of H∗i and zi on i
to simplify notation. However, it should be noted that the assumptions are with respect to each
player and must hold individually for each player i. Now we are ready to state and describe the
implications of our assumptions.
The following assumption ensures that the expected loss is strongly convex and smooth.
Assumption 1. Let S be the support of the vector v, i.e. S .= {i| |vi| > 0}. Then, there exists
constants Cmin > 0 and Dmax ≤ |S| such that:
λmin(H
∗
SS) ≥ Cmin and λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) ≤ Dmax,
for all i, where λmin(.) and λmax(.) denote the minimum and maximum eigenvalues respectively
and H∗SS = {H∗i,j |i, j ∈ S}.
To better understand the implications of the above assumptions first note that the distribution
over joint actions in (3), after some algebraic manipulations, can be written as follows:
p(x) =
(
q − |NE∗|/2n
1− |NE∗|/2n
)
1 [x ∈ NE∗]
|NE∗|
(
1− q
1− |NE∗|/2n
)
1
2n
. (8)
Thus, we have that the distribution over joint actions is a mixture of two uniform distributions,
one over the number of Nash equilibria and the other being the Rademacher distribution over n
variables. We denote the latter distribution byRn, i.e. x ∼ Rn =⇒ x ∈ {−1,+1}n∧p(x) = 1/2n
for all x. Therefore the expected Hessian matrix H∗ decomposes as a convex combination of
two other Hessian matrices:
H∗ = νHNE
∗
+ (1− ν)HR, (9)
where we have defined:
HNE∗ .=
1
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
η(v∗T z)zzT ,
HR
.
= Ez∼Rn
[
η(v∗T z)zzT
]
,
ν
.
=
(
q − |NE∗|/2n
1− |NE∗|/2n
)
.
Now, by concavity of λmin(.) and the Jensen’s inequality we have that
Cmin ≥ νλmin(HNE∗SS ) + (1− ν)λmin(HRSS)
≥ νλmin(HNE∗SS ) + (1− ν)η(‖v∗‖1)
≥ (1− ν)η(‖v∗‖1) > 0,
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where the last line follows from the fact thatHNE
∗
SS is positive semi-definite. In fact the minimum
eigenvalue, λmin(HNE
∗
SS ), is zero if |NE∗| < n. Thus, we have that our assumption of q ∈
(NE∗/2n, 1) automatically implies that λmin(H∗i ) ≥ Cmin > 0. We can also verify that the
maximum eigenvalue is bounded as follows:
Dmax ≤ νλmax
(
1
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zSz
T
S
)
+ (1− ν)λmax(Ez∼Rn
[
zSz
T
S
]
)
≤ ν |S|+ (1− ν).
The following assumption characterizes the minimum payoff in the Nash equilibria set.
Assumption 2. The minimum payoff in the PSNE set, ρmin, is strictly positive, specifically:
xi(w
∗
−i
Tx−i − bi) ≥ ρmin > 5Cmin/Dmax (∀ x ∈ NE∗).
Note that as long as the minimum payoff is strictly positive, we can scale the parameters
(W∗,b∗) by the constant 5Cmin/Dmax to satisfy the condition: ρmin > 5Cmin/Dmax, without chang-
ing the PSNE set or the likelihood of the data. Indeed the assumption that the minimum payoff
is strictly positive is is unavoidable for exact recovery of the PSNE set in a noisy setting such as
ours, because otherwise this is akin to exactly recovering the parameters v for each player i. For
example, if x ∈ NE∗ is such that v∗Tx = 0, then it can be shown that even if ‖v∗ − v̂‖∞ = ε,
for any ε arbitrarily close to 0, then v̂Tx < 0 and therefore NE(W∗,b∗) 6= NE(Ŵ, b̂). Next,
we present our main theoretical results for learning LIGs.
4.2 Theoretical Guarantees
Our main strategy for obtaining exact PSNE recovery guarantees is to first show, using results
from random matrix theory, that given the assumptions on the eigenvalues of the population
Hessian matrices, the assumptions hold in the finite sample case with high probability. Then,
we exploit the convexity properties of the logistic loss function to show that the weight vectors
learned using penalized logistic regression is “close” to the true weight vectors. By our assumption
that the minimum payoff in the PSNE set is strictly greater than zero, we show that the weight
vectors inferred from a finite sample of joint actions induce the same PSNE set as the true weight
vectors.
4.2.1 Minimum and Maximum Eigenvalues of Finite Sample Hessian and Scatter Matrices
The following technical lemma shows that the assumptions on the eigenvalues of the Hessian
matrices, hold with high probability in the finite sample case.
Lemma 1. If λmin(H∗SS) ≥ Cmin and λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) ≤ Dmax then we have that
λmin(H
m
SS) ≥
Cmin
2
and λmax
(
m∑
l=1
z
(l)
S z
(l)
S
T
)
≤ 2Dmax
with probability at least
1− |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
and 1− |S| exp
(−m(1− ν)
4 |S|
)
respectively.
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Proof. Let µmin
.
= λmin(H
∗
SS) and µmax
.
= λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
). First note that for all z ∈
{−1,+1}n:
λmax(η(v
∗
S
T zS)zSz
T
S ) ≤
|S|
4
.
= R
λmax(zSz
T
S ) ≤ |S| .= R′.
Using the Matrix Chernoff bounds from Tropp [9](Theorem 1.1), we have that
Pr {λmin(HmSS) ≤ (1− δ)µmin} ≤ |S|
[
e−δ
(1− δ)1−δ
]mµmin
R
.
Setting δ = 1/2 we get that
Pr {λmin(HmSS) ≤ µmin/2} ≤ |S|
[√
2
e
] 4mµmin
|S|
≤ |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
.
Therefore, we have
Pr {λmin(HmSS) > Cmin/2} > 1− |S| exp
(−mCmin
2 |S|
)
.
Next, we have that
µmax = λmax(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
) ≥ λmin(Ex
[
zSz
T
S
]
)
≥ νλmin
(
1
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zSz
T
S
)
+ (1− ν)
≥ (1− ν).
Once again invoking Theorem 1.1 from [9] and setting δ = 1 we have that
Pr {λmax ≥ (1 + δ)µmax} ≤ |S|
[
eδ
(1 + δ)1+δ
](mµmax)/R′
=⇒ Pr {λmax ≥ 2µmax} ≤ |S|
[e
4
](mµmax)/|S| ≤ |S| exp(−mµmax
4 |S|
)
≤ |S| exp
(−m(1− ν)
4 |S|
)
.
Therefore, we have that
Pr {λmax < 2Dmax} > 1− |S| exp
(−m(1− ν)
4 |S|
)
.
4.2.2 Recovering the Pure Strategy Nash Equilibria (PSNE) Set
Before presenting our main result on the exact recovery of the PSNE set from noisy observations
of joint actions, we first present a few technical lemmas that would be helpful in proving the
main result. The following lemma bounds the gradient of the loss function (5) at the true vector
v∗, for all players.
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Lemma 2. With probability at least 1− δ for δ ∈ [0, 1], we have that
‖∇`(v∗,D)‖∞ < νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
where κ = 1/(1+exp(ρmin)) and ρmin ≥ 0 is the minimum payoff in the PSNE set.
Proof. Let um .= ∇`(v∗,D) and umj denote the j-th index of um. We have that
(∀ j ∈ Sc ∧ j 6= n) E [umj ]
=
ν
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
+ (1− ν)Ez∼Rn
[
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
]
=
ν
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
+ (1− ν)
{
EzS∼R|S|
[
1
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
]
Ezj∼R [zj ]
}
≤ νκ|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
xixj ≤ νκ
Similarly,
(∀ j ∈ S ∧ j 6= n) E [umj ]
=
ν
|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
+ (1− ν)Ez∼Rn
[
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
]
≤ ν|NE∗|
∑
x∈NE∗
zj
1 + exp((v∗S)T zS)
+ (1− ν)Ezj∼R [zj ]
≤ νκ.
Following the same procedure as above, it can be easily shown that the above bounds hold for
the case j = n as well. Also note that
∣∣∣umj ∣∣∣ ≤ 1. Therefore, by using the Hoeffding’s inequality
[10] and a union bound argument we have that:
Pr
{
n
max
j=1
∣∣umj − E [umj ]∣∣ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um − E [um]‖∞ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um‖∞ − ‖E [um]‖∞ < t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2
=⇒ Pr {‖um‖∞ < νκ+ t} > 1− 2ne−mt
2/2.
Setting 2n exp(−mt2/2) = δ, we prove our claim.
A consequence of Lemma 2 is that, even with an infinite number of samples, the gradient of
the loss function at the true vector v∗ doesn’t vanish. Therefore, we cannot hope to recover
the parameters of the true game perfectly even with an infinite number of samples. In the
following technical lemma we show that the optimal vector v̂ for the logistic regression problem
is close to the true vector v∗ in the support set S of v∗. Next, in Lemma 4, we bound the
difference between the true vector v∗ and the optimal vector v̂ in the non-support set. The
lemmas together show that the optimal vector is close to the true vector.
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Lemma 3. If the regularization parameter λ satisfies the following condition:
λ ≤ 5C
2
min
16 |S|Dmax − νκ−
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
then
‖v∗S − v̂S‖2 ≤
5Cmin
4
√|S|Dmax ,
with probability at least 1− (δ + |S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|) + |S| exp((−m(1−ν))/4|S|)).
Proof. The proof of this lemma follows the general proof structure of Lemma 3 in [7]. First, we
reparameterize the `1-regularized loss function
f(vS) = `(vS) + λ ‖vS‖1
as the loss function f˜ , which gives the loss at a point that is ∆S distance away from the true
parameter v∗S as follows:
f˜(∆S) = `(v
∗
S + ∆S)− `(v∗S) + λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1),
where ∆S = vS −v∗S . Also note that the loss function f˜ is shifted such that the loss at the true
parameter v∗S is 0, i.e. f˜(0) = 0. Further, note that the function f˜ is convex and is minimized
at ∆̂S = v̂S − v∗S , since v̂S minimizes f . Therefore, clearly f˜(∆̂S) ≤ 0. Thus, if we can show
that the function f˜ is strictly positive on the surface of a ball of radius b, then the point ∆̂S lies
inside the ball i.e. ‖v̂S − v∗S‖2 ≤ b. Using the Taylor’s theorem we expand the first term of f˜
to get the following:
f˜(∆S) = ∇`(v∗S)T∆S + ∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S + λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1), (10)
for some θ ∈ [0, 1]. Next, we lower bound each of the terms in (10). Using the Cauchy-Schwartz
inequality, the first term in (10) is bounded as follows:
∇`(v∗S)T∆S ≥ −‖∇`(v∗S)‖∞ ‖∆S‖1 ≥ −‖∇`(v∗S)‖∞
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2
≥ −b
√
|S|
(
νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
, (11)
with probability at least 1 − δ for δ ∈ [0, 1]. It is also easy to upper bound the last term in
equation 10, using the reverse triangle inequality as follows:
λ |‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1| ≤ λ ‖∆S‖1 .
Which then implies the following lower bound:
λ(‖v∗S + ∆S‖1 − ‖v∗S‖1) ≥ −λ ‖∆S‖1 ≥ −λ
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2
= −λ
√
|S|b. (12)
Now we turn our attention to computing a lower bound of the second term of (10), which is a
bit more involved.
∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S ≥ min‖∆S‖2=b
∆TS∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)∆S
= b2λmin(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)).
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Now,
λmin(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)) ≥ min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S))
= min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
(
1
m
m∑
l=1
η((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
)
.
Again, using the Taylor’s theorem to expand the function η we get
η((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S ) = η((v
∗
S)
T z
(l)
S ) + η
′((v∗S + θ¯∆S)
T z
(l)
S )(θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S
, where θ¯ ∈ [0, θ]. Continuing from above and from Lemma 1 we have, with probability at least
1− |S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|):
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S))
≥ min
θ∈[0,1]
λmin
(
1
m
m∑
l=1
η((v∗S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
+
1
m
m∑
l=1
η′((v∗S + θ¯∆S)
T z
(l)
S )((θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
)
≥ λmin(HmSS)− max
θ∈[0,1]
|||A(θ)|||2 ≥
Cmin
2
− max
θ∈[0,1]
|||A(θ)|||2,
where we have defined
A(θ)
.
=
1
m
m∑
l=1
η′((v∗S + θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S )(θ∆S)
T z
(l)
S z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T .
Next, the spectral norm of A(θ) can be bounded as follows:
|||A(θ)|||2 ≤ max‖y‖2=1
{
1
m
m∑
l=1
∣∣∣η′((v∗S + θ∆S)T z(l)S )∣∣∣ ∣∣∣((θ∆S)T z(l)S )∣∣∣× yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
}
< max
‖y‖2=1
{
1
10m
m∑
l=1
‖(θ∆S)‖1
∥∥∥z(l)S ∥∥∥∞ yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
}
≤ θ max
‖y‖2=1
{
1
10m
m∑
l=1
√
|S| ‖∆S‖2 yT (z(l)S (z(l)S )T )y
}
= θb
√
|S|
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣ 110m
m∑
l=1
z
(l)
S (z
(l)
S )
T
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
∣∣∣∣∣
2
≤ (b
√|S|Dmax)
5
≤ Cmin
4
,
where in the second line we used the fact that η′(.) < 1/10 and in the last line we assumed that
(b
√
|S|Dmax)/5 ≤ Cmin/4 — an assumption that we verify momentarily. Having upper bounded the
spectral norm of A(θ), we have
λmin
(∇2`(v∗S + θ∆S)) ≥ Cmin4 . (13)
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Plugging back the bounds given by (11), (12) and (13) in (10) and equating to zero we get
−b
√
|S|
(
νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
+
b2Cmin
4
− λ
√
|S|b = 0
=⇒ b = 4
√|S|
Cmin
(
λ+ νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
.
Finally, coming back to our prior assumption we have
b =
4
√|S|
Cmin
(
λ+ νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
)
≤ 5Cmin
4
√|S|Dmax .
The above assumption holds if the regularization parameter λ is bounded as follows:
λ ≤ 5C
2
min
16 |S|Dmax −
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
− νκ.
Lemma 4. If the regularization parameter λ satisfies the following condition:
λ ≥ νκ+
√
2
m
log
2n
δ
,
then we have that
‖v̂ − v∗‖1 ≤
5Cmin
Dmax
with probability at least 1− (δ + |S| exp((−mCmin)/2|S|) + |S| exp((−m(1−ν))/4|S|)).
Proof. Define ∆ .= v̂ − v∗. Also for any vector y let the notation yS denote the vector y with
the entries not in the support, S, set to zero, i.e.
[
yS
]
i
=
{
yi if i ∈ S,
0 otherwise.
Similarly, let the notation ySc denote the vector y with the entries not in S
c set to zero, where
Sc is the complement of S. Having introduced our notation and since, S is the support of the
true vector v∗, we have by definition that v∗ = v∗
S
. We then have, using the reverse triangle
inequality,
‖v̂‖1 = ‖v∗ + ∆‖1 =
∥∥v∗
S
+ ∆S + ∆Sc
∥∥
1
=
∥∥v∗
S
− (−∆S)
∥∥
1
+
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1
≥ ‖v∗‖1 −
∥∥∆S∥∥1 + ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 . (14)
Also, from the optimality of v̂ for the `1-regularized problem we have that
`(v∗) + λ ‖v∗‖1 ≥ `(v̂) + λ ‖v̂‖1
=⇒ λ(‖v∗‖1 − ‖v̂‖1) ≥ `(v̂)− `(v∗). (15)
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Next, from convexity of `(.) and using the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality we have that
`(v̂)− `(v∗) ≥ ∇`(v∗)T (v̂ − v∗) ≥ −‖∇`(v∗)‖∞ ‖∆‖1
≥ −λ
2
‖∆‖1 , (16)
where in the last line we used the fact that λ ≥ ‖∇`(v∗)‖∞. Thus, we have from (14), (15) and
(16) that
1
2
‖∆‖1 ≥ ‖v̂‖1 − ‖v∗‖1
=⇒ 1
2
‖∆‖1 ≥
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 − ∥∥∆S∥∥1
=⇒ 1
2
∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 + 12 ∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≥ ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 − ∥∥∆S∥∥1
=⇒ 3 ∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≥ ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 . (17)
Finally, from (17) and Lemma 3 we have that
‖∆‖1 =
∥∥∆S∥∥1 + ∥∥∆Sc∥∥1 ≤ 4∥∥∆S∥∥1 ≤ 4√|S| ∥∥∆S∥∥2 ≤ 5CminDmax .
Now we are ready to present our main result on recovering the true PSNE set.
Theorem 1. If for all i, |Si| ≤ k, the minimum payoff ρmin ≥ 5Cmin/Dmax, and the regularization
parameter and the number of samples satisfy the following conditions:
νκ+
√
2
m
log
6n2
δ
≤ λ ≤ 2K + νκ−
√
2
m
log
6n2
δ
(18)
m ≥ max
{
2
K2
log
(
6n2
δ
)
,
2k
Cmin
log
(
3kn
δ
)
,
4k
1− ν log
(
3kn
δ
)}
, (19)
where K .= 5C2min/32kDmax − νκ, then with probability at least 1− δ, for δ ∈ [0, 1], we recover the
true PSNE set, i.e. NE(Ŵ, b̂) = NE(W∗,b∗).
Proof. From Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and Lemma 4 we have∣∣(v̂i − v∗i )T zi∣∣ ≤ ‖v̂i − v∗i ‖1 ‖zi‖∞ ≤ 5CminDmax .
Therefore, we have that
(v∗i )
T zi − 5Cmin
Dmax
≤ v̂Ti zi ≤ (v∗i )T zi +
5Cmin
Dmax
.
Now, if ∀ x ∈ NE∗, (v∗i )T zi ≥ 5Cmin/Dmax, then v̂Ti zi ≥ 0. Using an union bound argument over
all players i, we can show that the above holds with probability at least
1− n(δ + k exp((−mCmin)/2k) + k exp((−m(1−ν))/4k)) (20)
for all players. Therefore, we have that NE(Ŵ, b̂) = NE∗ with high probability. Finally, setting
δ = δ′/3n, for some δ′ ∈ [0, 1], and ensuring that the last two terms in (20) are at most δ′/3n each,
we prove our claim.
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To better understand the implications of the theorem above, we discuss some possible oper-
ating regimes for learning sparse linear influence games in the following paragraphs.
Remark 1 (Sample complexity for fixed q). In the theorem above, if q is constant, which in
turn makes ν constant, then K = Ω (1/k2), and the sample complexity of learning sparse linear
games grows as O (k4 log n). However, if q is small enough such that ν ≤ 1/k, then the constant
Dmax is no longer a function of k and hence K = Ω (1/k). Therefore, the sample complexity
scales as O (k2 log n) for exact PSNE recovery.
The sample complexity of O (poly(k) log n) for exact recovery of the PSNE set can be com-
pared with the sample complexity of O (kn3 log2 n) for the maximum likelihood estimate (MLE)
of the PSNE set as obtained by Honorio [11]. Note that while the MLE procedure is consistent,
i.e. MLE of the PSNE set is equal to the true PSNE set with probability converging to 1 as the
number of samples tend to infinity, it is NP-hard 3. In contrast, the logistic regression method
is computationally efficient. Further, while the sample complexity of our method seems to be
better than the empirical log-likelihood minimizer as given by Theorem 3 in [11], in this paper
we restrict ourselves to LIGs with strictly positive payoff in the PSNE set — such games are
invariably easier to learn than general LIGs considered by [11].
Honorio [11] also obtained lower bounds on the number of samples required by any conceivable
method, for exact PSNE recovery, by scaling the parameter q with the number of players.
Therefore, in order to compare our results with the information-theoretic limits of learning
LIGs, we consider the regime where the parameter q scales with the number of players n.
Remark 2 (Sample complexity for q varying with number of players). If we consider the regime
where the signal level scales as q = (|NE∗|+1)/2n. Then, Dmax = O (k/(2n−|NE∗|)), and as a
result K = Ω (2n/k2). Therefore, the sample complexity, which is dominated by the second and
third terms in (19), is given as O (k log(kn)). In general if q = Θ (exp(−n)), then the sample
complexity for recovering the PSNE set exactly is O (k log(kn)).
Once again we observe that even in the regime of q scaling exponentially with n, the sample
complexity of O (k log(kn)) is better than the information theoretic limit of O (kn log2 n), by a
factor of O (n log n). This can be attributed to the fact that we consider restricted ensembles of
games with strictly positive payoffs in the PSNE set, as opposed to general LIGs.
Further, from the aforementioned remarks we see that as the signal level q decreases, the
sufficient number of samples needed to recover the PSNE set reduces; and in the limiting
case of q decreasing exponentially with the number of players, the sample complexity scales
as O (k log(kn)). This seems counter-intuitive — with increased signal level, a learning problem
should become easier and not harder. To understand this seemingly counter-intuitive behavior,
first observe that the constant Dmax/Cmin can be thought of as the “condition number” of the loss
function given by 5, Therefore, the sample complexity as given by Theorem 1 can be written as
O (k2(Dmax/Cmin)2 log n). From (9), we see that as the signal level increases, the Hessian of the
loss becomes more ill-conditioned, since the data set now comprises of many repetitions of the
few joint-actions that are in the PSNE set; thereby increasing the dependency (Dmax) between
actions of players in the sample data set.
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Figure 1: The probability of exact recovery of the PSNE set computed across 40 randomly
sampled LIGs as the number of samples is scaled as b(C)(10c)(k2 log(6n2/δ))c, where c
is the control parameter and the constant C is 10000 for the k = 1 case and 1000 for
the remaining two case.
5 Experiments
In order to verify that our results and assumptions indeed hold in practice, we performed various
simulation experiments. We generated random LIGs for n players and exactly k neighbors by
first creating a matrix W of all zeros and then setting k off-diagonal entries of each row, chosen
uniformly at random, to −1. We set the bias for all players to 0. We found that any odd value
of k produces games with strictly positive payoff in the PSNE set. Therefore, for each value of
k in {1, 3, 5}, and n in {10, 12, 15, 20}, we generated 40 random LIGs. The parameters q and
δ were set to the constant value of 0.01 and the regularization parameter λ was set according
to Theorem 1 as some constant multiple of
√
(2/m) log(2n/δ). Figure 1 shows the probability of
successful recovery of the PSNE, for various combinations of (n, k), where the probability was
computed as the fraction of the 40 randomly sampled LIGs for which the learned PSNE set
matched the true PSNE set exactly. For each experiment, the number of samples was computed
as: b(C)(10c)(k2 log(6n2/δ))c, where c is the control parameter and the constant C is 10000 for
k = 1 and 1000 for k = 3 and 5. Thus, from Figure 1 we see that, the sample complexity of
O (k2 log n) as given by Theorem 1 indeed holds in practice — i.e. there exists constants c and
c′ such that if the number of samples is less than ck2 log n, we fail to recover the PSNE set
exactly with high probability, while if the number of samples is greater than c′k2 log n then we
are able to recover the PSNE set exactly, with high probability. Further, the scaling remains
consistent as the number of players n is changed from 10 to 20.
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we presented a computationally efficient and statistically consistent method,
based on `1-regularized logistic regression, for learning linear influence games — a subclass of
parametric graphical games with linear payoffs. Under some mild conditions on the true game,
we showed that as long as the number of samples scales as O (poly(k) log n), where n is the
number of players and k is the maximum number of neighbors of any player; then we can
recover the pure-strategy Nash equilibria set of the true game in polynomial time and with
3Irfan and Ortiz [4] showed that counting the number of Nash equilibria is #P-complete. Therefore, computing
the log-likelihood is NP-hard.
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probability converging to 1 as the number of samples tend to infinity. An interesting direction
for future work would be to consider structured actions — for instance permutations, directed
spanning trees, directed acyclic graphs among others — thereby extending the formalism of
linear influence games to the structured prediction setting. A more technical extension would
be to consider a local noise model where the observations are drawn from the PSNE set but
with each action independently corrupted by some noise. Other ideas that might be worth
pursuing are: considering mixed strategies, correlated equilibria and epsilon Nash equilibria,
and incorporating latent or unobserved actions and variables in the model.
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